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Cotton, Clemency, and Control: United States v. Klein and the Juridical
Legacy of Executive Pardon
Abstract

When the guns of war fell silent in 1865, Americans throughout the reunited states grappled with the logistics
of peace. At virtually every turn lay nebulous but critical questions of race, class, allegiance, and identity. More
pragmatic legal stumbling blocks could also be found strewn across the path to Reconstruction; some of them
would ensnare the healing nation for decades to come. Among their number was notorious Supreme Court
decision United States v. Klein (1872). Born on July 22, 1865 out of a small debate over the wartime seizure of
Vicksburg cotton stores, Klein quickly evolved into a legal behemoth. In its tangles with the separation of
powers, the presidential power of pardon, and the supremacy of the executive in judicial matters, United States
v. Klein would ultimately amount to the very poster child of the snowball effect at work in Reconstruction law.
Widely forgotten or overlooked today, the decision of United States v. Klein nonetheless stands as one of the
most crucial battles of the American Civil War era.
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COTTON, CLEMENCY, AND CONTROL:
UNITED STATES V. KLEIN AND THE JURIDICAL
LEGACY OF EXECUTIVE PARDON
Heather Clancy
On January 29, 1872, Chief Justice Salmon Portland
Chase rose from the bench to deliver one of his final
Supreme Court majority opinions.1 Flanked by the white
columns and red backdrop of the court chamber on that
January day, Chase peered out from under bushy white
brows to solemnly address his audience. For several tense
minutes he intoned the court’s ruling until finally concluding
tersely that sometimes brevity is the most appropriate
rhetorical choice and coming to a concise close. By the time
that Chase took his seat again, the aging justice had played
his part in deciding one of the most charged moments in
American legal history. Despite its humble origins as a
wartime compensation claim dispute over cotton, this 7-2
Supreme Court decision of United States v. Klein would
come to strongly reinforce the separation of powers,
crippling a congressional statute intended to limit
presidential pardoning clout and reaffirming the supremacy
1

Chase would spend his last day as Supreme Court Justice
hardly more than a year later, dying suddenly in New York on
May 7, 1873 at the age of 65. A writer for the San Francisco
Daily Evening Bulletin sang Chase’s praises on the evening of
his passing, remarking that although the Chief Justice had been
plagued by “broken health” in his later years, he nonetheless
stood as “an upright Judge, and a statesman who has become
illustrious in the history of his country.”

30

Cotton, Clemency, and Control
of the executive in judicial matters. Thus was offered one of
the most overlooked but critical legal verdicts of the
American Civil War era.
The story of United States v. Klein begins nearly a
decade before its conclusion, with the passage of Congress’s
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863.
As extended by a second act on July 2, 1864, the legislation
“authorized a recovery in the court of claims for the proceeds
of property captured and sold by the military authorities
without judicial condemnation after July 17, 1862, and
before March 12, 1863.”2 In passing the act, Congress
enabled owners of property that had been seized in the
course of the war to claim whatever proceeds had been
gained from the sale of the confiscated property.3 John A.

2

This summary of the Abandoned and Captured Properties Act
can be found under the General Index entry for the act in United
States Supreme Court, United States Supreme Court Reports,
Volumes 98-101 (Rochester, NY: The Lawyers Co-Operative
Publishing Company, 1901), 1087.
3
“1. Under [the Abandoned and Captured Properties Act] a party
preferring his claim in the Court of Claims, need not, where he
has purchased in good faith, prove the loyalty of the person from
whom he bought the property whose proceeds he claims. . . .
2. The vendor is a competent witness to support the claimant’s
case, if he never had any claim or right against the government,
and is not interested in the suit. . . .
3. In a claim under this act, the Court of Claims may render
judgment for a specific sum as due to the claimant.
4. Claimants under the act are not deprived of its benefits
because of aid and comfort not voluntarily given to the rebellion.
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Klein, acting administrator for the estate of Vicksburg
Collector of Customs Victor F. Wilson, would act in
accordance with the passing of the new act when he applied
in the Court of Claims for proceeds owed Wilson “for cotton
and interest due . . . and for refund of duties and internalrevenue tax.”4 The 664 bales of cotton in question
(amounting to $125,300 USD in claims) had been seized
from Wilson’s warehouse by Confederate troops in the
summer of 1863 during Grant’s siege of Vicksburg. 5 The

5. But voluntarily executing, even through motives of personal
friendship, the official bonds of quartermasters or commissaries
of the rebel army, was giving such aid and comfort. . . .
6. The mere taking possession of a city by the government
forces was not a ‘capture’ of all the cotton in it, within the
meaning of the act.”
United States Supreme Court, Cases Argued and Adjudged in
The Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1869
(Washington, DC: William H. Morrison, 1870), 817.
4
Victor F. Wilson died intestate—without a will—on July 22,
1865, only a few short weeks after the last Confederate troops
surrendered to Union forces. Wilson would be survived by his
widow Jane Wilson (d. 1878) and his children Ann Wilson, Jane
“Jeanie” Wilson, Ellen Wilson, Victor F. Wilson, Jr., Catherine
Wilson, and Robert Wilson. United States Supreme Court,
“United States, Appt., v. John A. Klein, Surviving Admr. of
Victor F. Wilson, Deceased” in United States Supreme Court
Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing
Company, 1912), 519-527. Victor F. Wilson family information
courtesy of Ancestry.com
5
This sum of $125,300 would amount to more than $2.36
million today once adjusted for inflation. (Calculation curtesy of
“Inflation Calculator,” http://www.davemanuel.com/inflationcalculator.php.)
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troops then took the cotton and “without his license or
consent” relocated it to “the various defenses of the town, to
protect it [the cotton] against the approaches and assaults of
the Union army.”6
The Confederate plan backfired, however, and the
bales were discovered and subsequently sold by the
victorious Union forces, with proceeds from the sales going
to the United States Treasury. The situation was further
complicated with a development on December 8, 1863,
when President Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation
offering pardon to any individual who had supported or
fought for the so-called Confederate States of America—
including full restoration of property rights—so long as the
individual was able and willing to take the oath of allegiance
to the United States.7 Victor F. Wilson would take eager
advantage of this offer, taking the oath of allegiance only
weeks later on February 15, 1864. After the war ended, Klein
submitted a claim for the 664 bales of cotton to the Court of
Claims on December 26, 1865. In 1866 the suit was brought
before the court for $125,300, at which time the court ruled
in favor of Wilson’s estate.8
6

United States Supreme Court, Digest of the United States
Supreme Court Reports: U. S. vols. 1-206 (Rochester, NY:
Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1908), 3.
7
Dictionary.Law.com defines an executive pardon as using “the
executive power of a Governor or President to forgive a person
convicted of a crime, thus removing any remaining penalties or
punishments and preventing any new prosecution of the person
for the crime for which the pardon was given.”
8
United States Supreme Court, “United States, Appt., v. John A.
Klein, Surviving Admr. of Victor F. Wilson, Deceased,” United

33

Clancy
It was only later revealed that Wilson had received
surety—guarantee of imbursement—in the form of two
Confederate bonds, one signed on August 11, 1862 for
brigade quartermaster John H. Crump and the other in 1863
for an assistant commissary. This acceptance of Confederate
bonds was a development that brought the sincerity of
Wilson’s 1864 oath of allegiance into question. The court
ruled that Klein himself “did give aid and comfort to the
rebellion and the persons engaged therein, and did not at all
times consistently adhere to the United States.” The ruling
did state, however, that Wilson’s children were minors
during the war and “never gave comfort to the rebellion.”
Wilson, likewise, “did adhere to the United States” during
the period in question, his pardon having “[relieved] him
from any charge of disloyalty on account of his having
become surety.” On May 26, 1869, the Court of Claims ruled
that Wilson’s estate was entitled to receive the full $125,300
and so decreed the entirety of the amount to Klein to
administer to Wilson’s estate. 9
States Supreme Court Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY:
E.R. Andrews Printing Company, 1912), 519-527.
9
Readers may find it intriguing to learn that the case of the 664
bales of stolen cotton was not the first of Wilson’s wartime
misfortunes. On September 5, 1862, it was reported in the
Vicksburg Evening Citizen that previous day’s shelling of the
city and its port had resulted in a shell striking Wilson’s
residence. The shell “entered the northwest corner [of the house],
and from thence to the cellar, where it exploded, tearing things to
pieces generally, and coming out at the top of the building.”
United States House of Representatives, “Claims Arising Under
the Captured and Abandoned Property Act” in United States
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On April 30, 1870 the Supreme Court would decide
a parallel case to United States v. Klein in the form of United
States v. Padelford. Like Klein, Edward Padelford had
abandoned his stores of cotton due to wartime chaos and
“having participated in the rebellion had taken the amnesty
oath.” He then approached the Court of Claims in the hopes
of regaining the value of his lost cotton. The court ruled that
Padelford’s swearing of the oath of allegiance to secure the
presidential pardon had effectively negated his participation
in the late rebellion, making him eligible to claim the value
of his lost cotton. Lawyers representing the United States
then appealed the Padelford case before the Supreme Court,
only to be defeated again by the powerful presidential

Congressional Serial Set, Issue 3269 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1894), 2; United States Supreme
Court, “United States, Appt., v. John A. Klein, Surviving Admr.
of Victor F. Wilson, Deceased” in United States Supreme Court
Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing
Company, 1912), 520; United States Court of Claims, Reports
from the Court of Claims Submitted to the House of
Representatives, Volume 12 (Washington, DC: W.H. and O.H.
Morrison Law Books Publishers, 1877), 729; Charles C. Nott
and Samuel H. Huntington, Cases Decided in the Court of
Claims of the United States at the December Term 1871; and the
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in All the
Appealed Cases from 1865 to May 1872 (Washington, DC: W.H.
and O.H. Morrison Law Books Publishers, 1873), vii-viii; The
Philadelphia Inquirer, “Appointments, etc.,” June 23, 1865;
United States Supreme Court, “United States v. Klein” [80 U.S.
128 (1872)], in United States Reports: Cases Adjudged in the
Supreme Court, Volume 80 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1872), 132.
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pardon. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would rule in the
favor of Edward Padelford, affirming the Court of Claims
decision.10
Three months after the decision of United States v.
Padelford, on July 12, 1870 the progression of United States
v. Klein would be forced to diverge significantly from United
States v. Padelford’s trajectory when Congress passed what
became known at the time as the Drake proviso to the
General Appropriations Act of 1870, prohibiting the use of
a presidential pardon in applying for sale proceeds in the
Court of Claims:
Provided, That no pardon or amnesty granted
by the President, whether general or special,
by proclamation or otherwise, nor any
acceptance of such pardon or amnesty, nor
oath taken, or other act performed in
pursuance or as a condition thereof, shall be
admissible in evidence on the part of any
claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence
United States Supreme Court, “United States v. Klein” [80
U.S. 128 (1872)] in United States Reports, 132, 143; United
States Supreme Court, “United States v. Padelford” [76 U.S. 531
(1869)].
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/76/531/case.html;
United States Supreme Court, The Supreme Court Reporter,
Volume 15 (St. Louis: West Publishing Co, 1895), 170; The
Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, “The
President and Congress,” December 22, 1866. Published in The
Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art Volume
22 (London: Spottiswoode and Co., 1866).
10
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in support of any claim against the United
States, or to establish the standing of any
claimant in said court, or his right to bring or
maintain suit therein…
Furthermore, Republican Missouri Senator Charles D.
Drake’s proviso asserted that acceptance of such a pardon
amounted to evidence that the pardoned individual did in
fact provide support to the Confederacy and was therefore
ineligible to recover sale proceeds. By even requesting a
pardon, the Drake proviso claimed, an individual admitted
his own guilt. As a result, Wilson’s acceptance of Lincoln’s
pardon in 1862 would be reason enough to categorize
Wilson’s estate as ineligible to receive the proceeds from the
sale of the 664 bales of cotton seized in Vicksburg. The
ripples of this kind of ex post facto presidential pardon
limitation had chafed public opinion as far away as Britain,
with one British journalist calling such legislation “a
revolutionary measure, and the retrospective effect of the
change [a] violation of natural justice.” On the basis of the
new 1870 statute, the United States government appealed the
increasingly convoluted claims case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court then accepted United States v. Klein to
be the seventeenth of almost forty for review and trial during
that session, setting the date for its argument as April 21,
1871, only to be held under advisement until October of the
same year.11
United States Supreme Court, “United States v. Klein” [80
U.S. 128 (1872)], in United States Reports, 133; “The President
11
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On January 29, 1872, nearly a full seven years after
the Civil War’s conclusion, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in favor of John A. Klein and by extension the estate
of the late Victor F. Wilson. When Chief Justice Chase rose
and delivered the court’s opinion, he not only ruled in favor
of Klein and Wilson but also in favor of the presidency’s
executive pardoning power. The court ruled both that the
General Appropriations Act of 1870’s Drake proviso was
unconstitutional and that Congress had exceeded its
constitutionally-allotted legislative power by attempting to
dictate a judicial branch decision. Furthermore, the court
ruled that Congress had also encroached on the executive
branch’s domain in passing a statute intended to restrict the
power of the executive’s constitutional pardoning power. In
an opinion delivered by T.D. Lincoln, J.M. Carlisle, and
others on behalf of the appellee that was later recorded in
Volume 80 of the Supreme Court Reports, it was forcefully
asserted that “If [the president’s] acts are liable to be
controlled, modified, annulled, or defeated by Congress, the
division of powers in this government is a chimera and a
delusion.”12 Their sentiments are echoed perfectly in an
and Congress,” The Saturday Review [London], December 22,
1866; “Washington,” The New York Herald, April 24, 1871;
“Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill,” The Philadelphia
Inquirer, April 28, 1871.
12
Justices Samuel F. Miller and Joseph P. Bradley opposed the
majority opinion in United States v. Klein. Presenting the
dissenting opinion for the two was Miller, who argued that the
key issue at hand was that the Supreme Court honor the original
intent of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act: “to restore
the proceeds of such property to the loyal citizen, and to transfer
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Atlanta Daily Sun article of March 8, 1873 that utilized the
language of abolition when it forcefully maintained that
“This power to grant pardon and amnesty is vested by the
Constitution in the President alone. It cannot be fettered by
legislation.” The volatility of sentiment regarding the case
held by those involved in and monitoring its progress simply
cannot be overlooked. 13
Press coverage of United States v. Klein was as
diverse and spirited in opinion as that surrounding the
question of presidential pardon. One article originally
printed in The New York World was reprinted in Atlanta on
March 14, 1872. In it, the author reflected on the decision’s
relationship with the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted several years earlier on July 9, 1868. In the view of
the New York World author, the wording of the amendment’s
it absolutely to the government in the case of those who had
given active support to the Rebellion. . . . Can it be inferred from
anything found in the statute that Congress intended that this
property should ever be restored to the disloyal? I am unable to
discern any such intent.” For Justice Miller, the question of
Wilson’s loyalty was laid to rest by Wilson’s traitorous
acceptance of Confederate bonds. United States Supreme Court,
“United States, Appt., v. John A. Klein, Surviving Admr. of
Victor F. Wilson, Deceased”, 521; United States Supreme Court
Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing
Company, 1912), 526-527.
13
United States Supreme Court, “United States, Appt., v. John
A. Klein, Surviving Admr. of Victor F. Wilson, Deceased”, 521;
United States Supreme Court Reports, Volumes 78-81
(Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing Company, 1912), 521;
The Atlanta Daily Sun, “The Morrill Amendment, Speech of
Rep. Erasmus W. Beck, of Georgia” March 8, 1873.
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third section proves convoluted in light of the United States
v. Klein ruling. That third section reads as follows:
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of
President or Vice-President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United
States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote
of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
When read alongside the majority opinion of United States
v. Klein, the journalist argued, it might be interpreted that
prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, “all
citizens were eligible to office, even though they might have
participated in insurrection or rebellion, but that with the
adoption of the amendment such classes as are named
therein were rendered ineligible by reason of such
participation.” Thus, it was Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself that had “imposed” disabilities, rather
than merely outlined them for maximum Constitutional
40
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clarity. As a result, Johnson’s Proclamation 170 pardons of
July 4, 1868 under the executive freedom of pardon
reaffirmed under United States v. Klein became needlessly
complicated, rendered meaningless in the face of an
amendment that had defined punishment for a crime that had
not even existed until its ratification. A writer for the
Georgia Weekly Telegraph would respond some five days
later on March 19, 1872, writing that although the author for
The New York World held an argument that “seems
conclusive,” it was nonetheless one without pragmatic
worth. “Congress will not acknowledge it, and the precise
point is yet to be passed upon by the Federal courts.” It
would not do, he cautioned, to lose oneself in theory at a time
when the nation so desperately required level-mindedness.14
The same Georgia Weekly Telegraph journalist
continued on to provide one of the most vitriolic
condemnations of the Drake proviso to the General
Appropriations Act of 1870. The proviso was a spiteful
example of postwar federal legislation, he raged, that
The New York World, “Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Disqualify Anybody?” March 9, 1872. Reprinted under the same
title in The Atlanta Daily Sun, March 14, 1872; “14th
Amendment,” accessed via Legal Information Institute, Cornell
University Law School.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv;
Andrew Johnson, “Proclamation 170, Granting Pardon to All
Persons Participating in the Late Rebellion Except Those Under
Indictment for Treason or Other Felony,” 1868.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72270;
Georgia Weekly Telegraph, “An Interesting if not a Practical
Question,” March 19, 1872.
14
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attempted to “convert into poison and venom, a
constitutional act of Executive benignity.” This
Congressional design to corrupt a “generous and merciful
offer of pardon was the lowest example of legislative
retribution for the late rebellion,” the author continued.
There was no doubt in his mind that “the case is clear
enough” and it would only be proper that the United States
Supreme Court would stand in line with the executive
platform of official magnanimity, ruling in favor of the
deceased Victor F. Wilson. In agreement with him was a
reporter for the New York Herald on January 30, 1872 who
railed that “To repeal [the presidential pardon by way of the
Drake proviso] would be a breach of faith not less cruel and
astounding than to abandon the freed people whom the
Executive had promised to maintain in their freedom.” Once
again, a newspaper writer invoked enslavement and freedom
to legitimize his argument, appealing to the kindly
sentiments of his readers.15
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Klein has had an impressively resounding and varied legal
legacy. Although the case’s origins lay in a convoluted Civil
War property dispute, its utility in debates far removed from
its beginnings has been undeniable. In the 1980 United
The New York Herald, “United States Supreme Court:
Important Decision Based Upon the Drake Amendment of the
Appropriation Act of 1863–An Appeal to the Court of Claims by
the Administrator to the Estate of a Pardoned Rebel–Congress
and the Judiciary at Variance–The Chief Justice Claims Full
Jurisdiction and Orders the Property to be Returned to the
Suitor,” January 30, 1872.
15
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States v. Sioux State of Indians Black Hills claim, a Sioux
Nation push for compensation for federal seizure of their
ancestral lands stagnated in a quagmire of red tape. In the
case, a 1978 res judicata waiver served as the 1871
Congressional Drake proviso had in United States v. Klein,
complicating the court’s decision.16 Suspicions arose that the
waiver was an attempt to overrule a 1942 Court of Claims
decision in the Black Hills claim—a flagrant violation of the
separation of powers if true. In the Black Hills case, Justice
Harry Blackmun ultimately decided that holdings in United
States v. Klein did not apply to the Black Hills discussion;
the res judicata waiver lacked unconstitutional intent to
dictate the judicial branch’s decision, and it had liberating—
rather than restrictive—effects on adjudication.17
Former president William Clinton made reference to
United States v. Klein is his 2001 New York Times op-ed
piece “My Reasons for the Pardons.” In the article, he
defended certain pardons and commutations among the 140
and 36 he respectively made at the end of his presidency on
January 20, 2001. Among those released were Marc Rich
and Pincus Green, originally indicted in 1983 for
racketeering and fraud. By harkening back to United States
Res judicata: “the thing has been judged,” meaning the issue
before the court has already been decided by another court,
between the same parties. Therefore, the court will dismiss the
case before it as being useless. <Dictionary.Law.com>
17
Edward Lazarus, “The Highest Court in the Land” in Black
Hills White Justice: The Sioux Nation versus the United States,
1775 to the Present (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1999), 394-396.
16
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v. Klein, Clinton likely sought to legitimize his actions,
reminding readers of the freedom that the case had granted
presidents to pardon whom they chose and as they saw fit.
United States v. Klein would make a prominent appearance
again in 2008 with the legal debate Exxon Mobil
Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in
which a dense legal tangle arose surrounding the Trans
Alaska Pipeline System allowed by Congress in the Trans
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1651. In the
end it was concluded that the decision in United States v.
Klein had no relevancy in “the administrative context, much
less [in] an administrative ratemaking proceeding” as Klein
only applied to entities invested with judicial power. 18
Writings on the United States v. Klein decision have
sprung up just as richly in the world of academia. These
more recent analyses of the case have often been conducted
from a background of legal training, however, focusing on
the case’s utility in determining the outcome of modern court
rulings rather than on the historical significance of United
States v. Klein. Some, such as Martin H. Redish and
Christopher R. Pudelski—professor of Law and Public
Policy and law clerk, respectively—have made efforts to
defend a political theoretical reading of the case that some
have argued blows its true impact out of proportion, making
a grand judicial gesture of reinforcing the separation of
William Jefferson Clinton, “My Reasons for the Pardons,”
New York Times, February 18, 2001; Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
FERC, 571 F.3d 1208 (DC Cir. 2009).
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/08212_bio_petro.pdf.
18
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powers out of what is merely a “relatively brief and cryptic
post-Civil War decision.” Others have analyzed United
States v. Klein in the shadow of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA
Amendments Act of 2008), which established official
procedure for “authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign
intelligence,” including offering retroactive immunity by
providing “standards and procedures for liability protection
for electronic communication service providers who assisted
the Government between September 11, 2001 and January
17, 2007, when the President's Terrorist Surveillance
Program was brought under the FISA Court.” One such
scholar is Utah Law Review editor Nate Olsen, who stressed
in 2009 that the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 “is simply
bad law” because it “relies on a power Congress lacks,” a
conclusion that he reaches using United States v. Klein as
precedent for the restriction of Congressional hegemony.19
In two articles by Associate Professor of Law
Howard M. Wasserman of the Florida International
Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pudelski, “Legislative
Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process:
Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein,”
Northwestern University Law Review 100, no. 1 (2006): 437464; Redish and Pudelski, 463; FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text; Office
of Senator Kit Bond, “FISA Amendments Act of 2008,” The
Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2008. http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB121391360949290049; Nate Olsen, “Congress and the Court:
Retroactive Immunity in the FISA Amendments Act and the
Problem of United States v. Klein,” Utah Law Review 1353
(2009): 1-20; Olsen, 7.
19
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University College of Law, Wasserman further explores the
value of the case in post-9/11 judicial hearings. There is a
certain cult of Klein, argues Wasserman, which is largely
unsubstantiated. In general, he asserts, the case “does little
or no work, certainly not in non-pathological times.” The
case’s true efficacy, Wasserman states, is instead in its
historical role in “curbing the worst legislative excess,” a
crucial one as he notes that “Congress (or at least individual
members of Congress) may be willing to vote in favor of
unconstitutional legislation, [especially] in pathological
times, where the ordinary restraints are removed.” In the
post-9/11 political climate of frenetic homeland security
measures such as the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
Wasserman argues, United States v. Klein’s tempering of
Congressional profusion is instrumental.20
Gordon Young likewise looked askance at hasty
references made to United States v. Klein in his 1981 article
“Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction
and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited.” In it, he
made reference to past cases and situations that had “invoked
[Klein] for propositions on which it has little bearing other
than its establishment of the legitimacy of an inquiry into
Congress’ [sic] abuse of its power to regulate the federal
Howard M. Wasserman, “The Irrepressible Myth of Klein,”
University of Cincinnati Law Review 79 (2010): 53-96; Howard
M. Wasserman, “Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror,
and United States v. Klein,” Journal of National Security Law
and Policy 5 (2011): 211-235; Wasserman, “The Irrepressible
Myth of Klein,” 96; Wasserman, “Constitutional Pathology, the
War on Terror, and United States v. Klein,” 234-235.
20
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courts.” For instance, he outlined, the case had negligible
relevance to contemporary cases involving busing, abortion,
school prayers, and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Young
even went so far as to liken United States v. Klein to the
“unfortunate guests” of Procrustes, stretched mercilessly
without reflection or remorse.21
For the American people, their four-year civil war
would be the reaper of some 750,000 souls. 22 The conflict
would rend the nation with violence and loss. By its end, it
would remain for those who had survived to piece back
“Procrustes had an iron bed (or, according to some accounts,
two beds) on which he compelled his victims to lie. Here, if a
victim was shorter than the bed, he stretched him by hammering
or racking the body to fit. Alternatively, if the victim was longer
than the bed, he cut off the legs to make the body fit the bed’s
length. In either event the victim died. Ultimately Procrustes was
slain by his own method by the young Attic hero Theseus. . .”
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Procrustes: Greek
mythological figure.”
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Procrustes.
Gordon G. Young, “Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’
Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited,”
Wisconsin Law Review 1189 (1981): 1189-1262; Young,
“Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and
Processes,” 1261.
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This 750,000 statistic reflects historian J. David Hecker’s
recent scholarship on the casualty figures of the Civil War,
which utilized 1860 and 1870 census data to project how United
States demographics might have appeared had the war not taken
such a deadly toll. J. David Hacker, “Recounting the Dead,” The
New York Times, Opinionator, 20 September 2011.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/recounting-thedead/.
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together that which had been so viciously torn apart in the
struggle for Union and freedom. Not unlike the endless
heaps of horsehair used by army surgeons to suture closed
the gaping wounds of those physically ravaged by the war,
it would be postwar rulings and legislation that would stitch
the war-torn nation back together after the guns fell silent in
1865. For decades the citizenry of the United States would
continue to negotiate a peace that was in many ways more
complicated than the violence which had preceded it. The
Supreme Court case United States v. Klein would function
as but a single step in the intricate process of mending the
nation. Even so, its role was a crucial one, helping to define
the utility and limits of executive magnanimity, reassert
presidential power, and further highlight both the divides
and intersections between the three branches of American
government. In the aging colossal legal apparatus of the
post-Civil War era, an unconsidered cog labeled United
States v. Klein labors on.
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